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The main objective of the following study is to introduce readers to the issue of 
the 2nd National Scientific Conference in the series “Atypical Employment Relations” organized 
on 3 October 2019 by the Centre for Atypical Employment Relations of the University of Lodz. 
The consequence of extending the right of coalition to persons performing paid work outside the 
employment relationship was that they were guaranteed important collective rights, which until 
1 January 2019 were reserved primarily for employees. The rights which Polish legislator ensured 
to non-employees include the right to equal treatment in employment due to membership in a trade 
union or performing trade union functions; the right to bargain with a view to the conclusion of 
collective agreement and other collective agreements; the right to bargain to resolve collective 
disputes and the right to organize strikes and other forms of protest, as well as the right to protect 
union activists. The author positively assesses the extension of collective rights to people engaged in 
gainful employment outside the employment relationship, noting a number of flawsand shortcomings 
of the analyzed norms. The manner of regulating this matter, through the mechanism of referring 
to the relevant provisions regulating the situation of employees, the statutory equalization of the 
scope of collective rights of non-employees with the situation of employees, the lack of criteria 
differentiating these rights, as well as the adopted model of trade union representation based on 
company trade unions, not taking into account the specific situation of people working for profit
outside the employment relationship, are the reasons why the amendment to the trade union law is 
seen critically and requires further changes.
right of coalition, persons engaged in gainful employment outside employment 
relationship, non-employees, collective employment law, trade union.
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THE BLIZZARD OF THE WORLD:  
COVID-19 AND THE LAST SAY OF THE STATE OF EXCEPTION
Abstract. The paper aims to grasp the COVID-19 pandemic as a socio-political catastrophe in 
the Benjaminian sense. As argued in the article, the scope and nature of the COVID-19 crisis eludes 
us due to our closeness to its inner core. What is obfuscated in this moment is the politico-legal 
framework on which the international community is based, where sovereignty and turbocapitalism 
join their forces to produce biopolitical devices. The paper looks into uses of the state of exception 
in particular countries, concluding that the rule of law in the pandemic was generally put on the 
back burner even by the countries that officially praise it. Sovereignty clearly returned to the stage, 
undermining parliamentarism and civil liberties in the sake of necessity. International law remained 
incapable of addressing this return, let alone of enforcing responsibility of China for infringing WHO 
rules. As a conclusion the paper argues that COVID-19 opened new-old paths of governing the living 
that will play a planetary role in the future fights for dominance and imposing a new face of capitalism.
Keywords: COVID-19, state of exception, biopolitics, sovereignty, necessity.
ZADYMKA ŚWIATA:  
COVID-19 I OSTATNIE SŁOWO STANU WYJĄTKOWEGO
Streszcz nie. Celem artykułu jest ujęcie pandemii COVID-19 jak  socjopolitycznej katast y 
w sensie Waltera Benjamina. Zakres i natura kryzysu związanego z COVID-19 są nam niedostępne
z racji naszej bliskośc  do jego centrum. W tym szczególnym momencie zaciemnieniu ulegają 
polityczno-prawne ramy wspóln ty międzynarodowej, w których suweren ość i turbokapitalizm
łączą się w celu stworzenia biopolitycznych urządzeń. W artyk le dokonano przeglądu zastosowań 
stanu wyjątkowego w poszczególnych państwach; jego konkluzją jest ogólne zaniedbanie kwestii 
praworządności nawet w krajach, które głoszą do niej przywiązanie. Bez wątpienia kluczową rolę 
zaczęła ponownie odgrywać suwerenność – podważając parlamentaryzm oraz swobody obywatelskie 
w imię konieczności. Prawo międzynarodowe okazało się niezdolne nie tylko do odpowiedzi na to 
zjawisko, ale nawet do wyegzekwowania odpowiedzialności Chin za złamanie reguł WTO. Artykuł 
zamyka konkluzja, zgodnie z którą COVID-19 otworzył nowe-stare ścieżki zarządzania żywymi, które 
odegrają planetarną rolę w przyszłych walkach o dominację i przeobrażą funkcjonowanie kapitalizmu.
Słowa klucz we: COVID-19, stan wyjątkowy, biopolityka, suwerenn ść, konieczność.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Identifying Kafka as an essentially contemporary writer, Walter Benjamin 
made the following claim about the possibility of perceiving the catastrophe:
If one says that he perceived what was to come without perceiving what exists in the present, 
one should add that he perceived it essentially as an individual affected by it. His gestures of 
terror are given scope by the marvellous margin which the catastrophe will not grant us. But 
his experience was based solely on the tradition to which Kafka surrendered; there was no far-
sightedness or “prophetic vision.” Kafka listened to tradition, and he who listens hard does not 
see. (Benjamin 1969a, 143)
The perception of the catastrophe not as a singular event, but as the permanent 
essence of the development of history is of course a key to Benjamin’s latest 
version of historical materialism (Benjamin 1969b, 257). But in the above-cited 
fragment he rather links the ability to perceive a catastrophe with the possibility 
of occupying some “marvellous margin”. Kafka was able to notice the catastrophe 
precisely because he was immersed in (Jewish) tradition. By this very fact he was 
sensitive to apocalyptic sounds coming from afar, just like the people of Israel who 
listened to the godly voice; but between him and the catastrophe lay the margin 
that – Benjamin adds – won’t be “granted” to us. “We” see the catastrophe from 
too close a distance, experiencing it in all its impact, and without the mediation of 
the tradition that would shield it from us.
The COVID-19 pandemics is one catastrophe among others, another link 
in the chain of “anthropocenic” troubles that late capitalism keeps producing. 
It is particularly legal scholarship that should see it as another stage in the 
continuous catastrophe that reels before our eyes – and not a one-off break in the 
otherwise continuous normalcy that will be soon restored. Yet the Benjaminian 
trouble affects us as well: our tradition – especially the legacy of Schmittianand 
Agambenian thinking on the state of exception – allows us to hear, but not see. 
When we occupy “the marvellous margin” we are blind, but at the same time the 
catastrophe is already here, before our eyes. To see the current pandemic – in its 
legal dimension – as a mere recurrence of exception-based measures is to say too 
little; but without this perspective we see just the catastrophe, without knowing 
its nature. 
Accordingly, the already considerable COVID legal scholarship straddles 
between hearing and seeing. In this position, it can hardly make a move, as the 
key to our riddles lies ahead of us. With the benefit of the 20th century legal and 
philosophical thinking we can easily recognise the contours of what is happening: 
but at the same time the recurrence of states of exception, priority of the executive 
over the legislative and the judiciary, sovereign-centrism, mobilisation of populist 
reason against democracy is painfully sobering. It does not mean that these 
concepts and the intellectual traditions that inform them are useless; on the 
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contrary, they allow us to hear the ongoing catastrophe, but do not form a bridge 
with our position of seeing it.
In its legal dimension, COVID-19 could be used as a palpable example of 
Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic systems (Luhmann 2004): each state reacted 
to it according to its own internal dynamics and systemic specificity. Although 
some general patterns were recognisable in many countries (lockdowns, 
increase in penal reactions, priority of the executive, extraordinary legislation, 
national segregation), they were introduced with the use of various methods, 
each time according to the internal logic of Leibnizian monads. The adopted 
measures demonstrate, first of all, the possibility of suspending some basic 
liberal guarantees; what remains striking is the swiftness with which they were 
implemented, often without a clear link with diminishing the medical emergency. 
The sovereign state has always been here and the return of the state of exception 
may only prove the proponents of the post-Westphalian order wrong. Its return 
cut across the current political episteme that today make us see the political scene 
as divided between the significantly undermined liberal order and the populist 
onslaught on reason: legal criticism of emergency measures ran the risk of being 
identified with unreason indulging in conspiracy theories. 
Nonetheless, the greatest conspiracy theory we could think of is clearly visible 
for our eyes: the nature of currently existing states – with their extraordinary 
politico-legal weaponry behind their backs – squares well with contemporary 
capitalism and is not on the wane. For financial markets the year 2020 was 
astonishingly profitable, whereas the almost universal recession will throw masses 
of people into the conditions of yet bigger poverty and dependence (Bohoslavsky 
2020). State power is on the rise, methods of control have been tested out. Legal 
scholarship on COVID is on the mount, dealing with issues as diverge as the fate 
of legal professions and economic consequences of the pandemic, but focusing 
on constitutionality of the adopted measures.
This paper will venture a risky attempt of passing from hearing to seeing 
the catastrophe, whose impact and scope are still unclear to us. First, I will 
reanalyse the concepts of necessity and exception, in their link with specific 
responses to COVID-19. Then I will address the practical differences in handling 
the pandemic by liberal and illiberal states. Finally, I will take a quick detour 
to international law in order to look at its possible responses to COVID. 
2. SNEAKY NECESSITY AND THE OVERWHELMING EXCEPTION
In Kazuo Ishiguro’s recent novel, The Buried Giant, protagonists live in 
a post-war period under some kind of spell which make them forget about past 
feuds. Their memory is eclipsed with a mist of forgetfulness that brings peace for 
the sake of helpless oblivion. The current pandemic produces a comparable kind 
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of mist: we are willing to rake out exceptional measures as if the feuds and wars 
to which their use lead in the past were shrouded by forgetfulness. 
The pandemic is presented as an enemy, but a sneaky one: ubiquitous, 
hard to detect and constituting a special kind of necessity. Nonetheless, legally 
speaking, this necessity eludes the distinction between external and external 
threat. In the early phases of the pandemic, it came from abroad everywhere 
but China – just as a classic external enemy against whom putting up fences 
and closing borders should be adopted. In this phase, the pandemic unleashed 
a sovereigntist and nationalist logic: borders were closed for all except citizens 
and permanent residents, air connections were shut down, ‘repatriation’ actions 
were undertaken. The lockdown was conducted in the sovereign-centred 
manner; the states proved that true sovereignty lies in the ultimate power of 
suspension (cf. Schmitt 1985, 5; Agamben 2005). The globally recognised 
necessity allowed the states to suspend freedom of travel without much 
resistance at the international level. March 2020 was a period of universal 
national contraction, in which freedoms proved nothing but temporary 
concessions from sovereignty. In this role, sovereign states positioned 
themselves as the ultimate interpreters of necessity. Even if COVID-19 seems 
to impose – from an epidemiological point of view – a chain of typical reactions 
(shutdown of trade, travel and movement), it is up to the sovereign power 
to decide on what the necessity really is. Apart from the medical emergency, 
there is also another kind of necessity that needs to be balanced with the 
COVID: economy. The dilemma of which goal to pursue: healthcare protection 
or economic development was decided by sovereign powers (Bohoslavsky 
2020), and obviously not in order to avoid the situation in which the crisis hits 
the most vulnerable members of the society. The sovereign choice shrouds 
inequality – in its many dimensions, from economic differentiation to gender 
inequality (Bohoslavsky 2020) – with the aura of unquestionability.
“How it ultimately should be”: that a kind of thinking that unites, at the 
deepest level, sovereignty and health emergency. In its reactions to autonomously 
defined necessity, states resorted to the classic logic of nationalism (in Anderson’s 
and Billig’s understandings – see Anderson 1991; Billig 1995) against health 
reasons: they admitted their own citizens from abroad, but denied access 
to foreigners just as if its ‘own’ citizens had posed less danger than all other 
people. Even if nowadays these measures seem to be just groping in the dark, 
without the full knowledge of how COVID works, it should be properly seen as 
an ominous sign: a possibility of resolving the questions of necessity, regardless 
of its nature, along the lines of the old nationalist and sovereigntist logic. Diversity 
of state reactions posed practical problems for people travelling across many 
countries, sometimes barring their way of return. In so doing, states revealed an 
intimate relationship between sovereignty and citizenship which might be omitted 
if we concentrate – after Agamben – on the biopolitical status of bare life. By 
© by the author, licensee Łódź University – Łódź University Press, Łódź, Poland. This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
The Blizzard of the World: COVID-19 and the Last Say of the State of Exception 21
recalling their citizens from the entire world and barring access to non-citizens 
states demonstrated the tight link between inclusion and exclusion that founds 
citizenship. Analogously to structuralist understanding of the signifier as drawing 
meaning from a web of negative relations to other signifiers, citizenship proved 
to be a right to be admitted due to everyone else’s exclusion.
The chain of entanglements that binds sovereignty and citizenship should 
be confronted with another one: the relationship between sovereignty and the 
executive. As diagnosed already by Schmitt (Schmitt 1988), the executive exhibits 
proneness to overtaking other state powers in times of emergency, most notably 
by eclipsing parliamentarism. In constitutional theory parliamentarism requires as 
its prerequisites freedom of speech, freedom of discussion and the general public 
that can influence the decision-making process.
All specifically parliamentary arrangements and norms receive their meaning 
first through discussion and openness. This is especially true of the fundamental 
principle that is still recognized constitutionally, although practically hardly still 
believed in today, that the representative is independent of his constituents and 
party; it applies to the provisions concerning freedom of speech and immunity of 
representatives, the openness of parliamentary proceedings, and so forth. These 
arrangements would be unintelligible if the principle of public discussion were no 
longer believed in (Schmitt 1988, 3).
In an almost Badiouian manner, the parliament is for Schmitt a locus of truth-
production which, as soon as colonised by technical expertise – not even by an 
open dictatorship, but by dominance of the executive, ceases to exist truly:
If parliament should change from an institution of evident truth into a simply 
practical-technical means, then it only has to be shown via facta, through 
some kind of experience, not even necessarily through an open, self-declared 
dictatorship, that things could be otherwise and parliament is then finished 
(Schmitt 1988, 8).
According to Schmitt, mass democracy throws parliamentarism into a specific 
crisis which amplifies, but is not equivalent to, the crisis of democracy as such:
The crisis of the parliamentary system and of parliamentary institutions in fact springs from 
the circumstances of modern mass democracy. These lead first of all to a crisis of democracy 
itself, because the problem of a substantial equality and homogeneity, which is necessary 
to democracy, cannot be resolved by the general equality of mankind. It leads further to a crisis 
of parliamentarism that must certainly be distinguished from the crisis of democracy. Both 
crises have appeared today at the same time and each one aggravates the other, but they are 
conceptually and in reality different. As democracy, modern mass democracy attempts to realize 
an identity of governed and governing, and thus it confronts parliament as an inconceivable 
and outmoded institution. If democratic identity is taken seriously, then in an emergency, no 
other constitutional institution can withstand the sole criterion of the people’s will, however 
it is expressed. Against the will of the people especially an institution based on discussion by 
independent representatives has no autonomous justification for its existence, even less so 
because the belief in discussion is not democratic but originally liberal. (Schmitt 1988, 15)
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In other words, the position of the parliament as the embodiment of the will of 
the people is no longer taken for granted. Sovereignty might be – and, practically, is 
– exercised in its true locus that is revealed in the state of emergency. Accordingly,
in the pandemic the balance of state powers was profoundly disturbed in a multi-
dimensional way. Many states drifted far from the pole connoting parliamentarism, 
open discussion, human rights and inclusion of individuals – towards the pole that 
concentrates opposite paradigms: priority of the executive, secret decision-making 
(often explained away with the authority of experts, even though the way from 
acknowledging experts’ recommendations to adopting particular measures is not 
only long, but most importantly, political), suspension of applicable human rights 
and exclusion of individuals through the category of citizenship. It is in this last 
aspect that the profoundly political nature of response to COVID was palpable: 
it would be absurd to claim that nationals of a given country pose a smaller 
health risk than other human beings, but this is the practical effect of biopolitical 
devices used. The pandemic acted like a trigger, unleashing sovereignty-oriented 
apparatuses of the state and producing a generalised state of exception (although 
not everywhere the eponymous legal device was officially used).
Therefore it is crucial to perceive the multifarious, but convergent trends 
in response to COVID as consisting of a few key elements that are structurally 
intertwined. First, there is a visible swerve towards priority of the executive. As 
noted by Elena Griglio, ‘In Europe, executive dominance in policymaking is 
indisputably one of the effects of the spread of the pandemic. … The participation 
of parliaments in decision-making has been confined in scope – since many urgent 
governmental measures were adopted bypassing legislatures – and in their room 
for manoeuvre, since their legislative prerogatives were reduced to little more 
than ratifying executive proposals.’ (Griglio 2020, 49–50). An analogical process 
took place in the EU (Griglio 2020, 50). This ‘hour of the executive’, as Tristan 
Barczak calls it (Barczak 2020), was – as usual – argued in terms of a necessity 
of a quick and pragmatic reaction that could not be taken by deliberative, in 
particular parliamentary bodies. The ability “to get things done” (Petrov 2020, 78) 
of the executive is its well-known aura that paves the way for extralegal measures 
legitimised directly – and in the atmosphere of tacit conjuration – by the objective 
that “must be reached”.
Second, the role of the legislative was severely limited in two dimensions: 
first, the parliaments were truncated in order to reduce the spread of the virus 
amongst the deputies (Griglio 2020, 53–54; Bar-Siman-Tov 2020, 14–18), 
but even more importantly, as usual in exceptional times they were relegated 
to a subsidiary role of more or less tacit acceptants and occasional overseers of 
measures adopted by the executive (Griglio 2020, 52, 54; Barczak 2020; Petrov 
2020, 72–79; Quintana, Uriburu 2020, 691). These restrictions were materialised 
with additional methods of surveillance used by governments (Borovitskaja 2020, 
4). As in the case of Israeli Knesset, the organisation of parliaments under COVID 
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also preferred their “executive” side: instead of a general freedom of expression, 
parliaments were monopolised by speakers, committees and party leaders (Bar-
Siman-Tov 2020, 25–29; Cormacaina, Bar-Siman-Tov 2020, 9; Griglio 2020, 62). 
Rarely these measures were challenged in courts. In Israel, the Supreme Court 
ordered the parliament to reconvene, unleashing a constitutional crisis due to the 
disagreement of some representatives with the order (Bar-Siman-Tov 2020, 39). 
Only in Columbia a decree establishing the online parliamentary sessions was 
openly declared unconstitutional (Bar-Siman-Tov 2020, 17).
As noticed by Griglio, “executive dominance is not a novelty for representative 
democracies. In the last few decades, representative assemblies have been 
marginalised at least in their traditional role as legislators and decisionmakers” 
(Griglio 2020, 50). What Griglio describes is not far from Schmitt’s pre-war 
analyses: it seems that “in the liberal legal order there is a kind of cyclicity, in 
which the period of decaying parliamentarism happens in purportedly ‘golden’ 
times of capitalist development, only to be revealed as already rotten when a crisis 
comes.” In fact, the practical state of exception only reveals the hollowing out 
of democratic institutions that has been happening for a long time. In this vein, 
Schmitt’s remarks only cast light on the ongoing process of deterioration that 
became visible when the state of exception formally came.
Accordingly, it should not be of any surprise what John Maxeiner noticed à 
propos the US legal system: 
America’s legal system as a system of laws is failing. America’s responses to coronavirus have 
had more in common with a reign of men than with a government of laws. […] Long before the 
coronavirus reached America’s shores, the United States was falling short in fulfilling a rule of 
law. Instead of practicing the government of laws that its Founders sought, it has been suffering 
a government of men that they feared. (Maxeiner 2020, 215–216)
In case of the US, the imbalance between the executive and the legislative – as 
well as between the federal and state levels – are rooted in the inadequacies of the 
American constitution to present-day conditions (Maxeiner 2020, 232–233). But 
in other countries the pandemic revealed structural deficiencies of political and 
constitutional systems of their own. Constitutional states of exceptions were either 
modified by statutory laws (and subsequent ordinances) or ignored and replaced 
by sub-constitutional norms. Even in Germany, which might seem the closest 
to the Rechtsstaat-ideal, the three types of Notstandverfassungen contained in 
the Basic Law were found insufficient and a new law was adopted (Gesetz zum 
Schutz der Bevölkerung bei einer epidemischen Lage von nationaler Tragweite) 
to declare a special state of emergency – “the situation of epidemic of national 
scale” (Barczak 2020).
Another trait of pandemic governance was severe limitation of human rights, 
especially freedom of movement, right to privacy, religious freedoms and freedom 
of assembly (Quintana, Uriburu 2020, 691; Windholz 2020, 98–99). In the entire 
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world millions of people were confined to their homes, with various kinds of 
restrictions adopted in order to control the freedom of movement (El Fakhry 
Tuttle 2020; Das Neves Gonçalves 2020, 4). Apart from the intrastate restrictions, 
cross-border travel was severely limited (Maxeiner 2020, 213), thereby producing 
a Panoptikon-like ideal of the nation-state: individuals of every nationality are 
securely locked in their countries and in their own homes. All those who did not fit 
into this ‘neat’ classification – stateless persons or foreigners, homeless individuals 
– were left stranded. Limitations to human rights were coupled with increased 
penal measures and, quite often, excessive fines (Windholz 2020, 99). Human 
beings as such – depending on the categories they belonged to – were turned into 
a threat; as Agamben noticed, the laws turned people into potential infectors:
Fatte le debite differenze, le recenti disposizioni (prese dal governo con dei decreti che 
ci piacerebbe sperare – ma è un’illusione – che non fossero confermati dal parlamento in leggi 
nei termini previsti) trasformano di fatto ogni individuo in un potenziale untore, esattamente 
come quelle sul terrorismo consideravano di fatto e di diritto ogni cittadino come un terrorista 
in potenza. (Agamben 2020b)
Finally, the role of the judiciary was effectively curbed. Only in few countries 
courts could play an active role in overseeing the exceptional measures adopted by 
the executive (or by the legislative acting upon the pressure of the executive). South 
Africa was a pioneer in this respect: by creating the post of COVID-19 Designate 
Judge (Petrov 2020, 80), it allowed a permanent monitoring of the emergency 
measures by a judicial mechanism – even if also ‘executivised’, that is reduced 
to one judge. Notably, the German Constitutional Court reacted to restrictions 
in the freedom of assembly, lifting the bans imposed on it (BVerfG, 29.04.2020, 
1 BvQ 44/20). The BVerfG argued that general restrictions on the freedom of 
assembly and religion are not proportionate to the pursued goal, and they need 
to be nuanced as well as allowing of exceptions. Generally, however, the response 
from courts was patchy and minimalistic (Petrov 2020, 89–91; Golia et al. 2020, 
53), just as if – against their constitutional position – they did not want to provide 
a concerted response to exceptional measures.
These reactions of particular legal systems may be seen as necessary 
adaptations of legal instruments – by nature, slow and inert vis-à-vis reality 
– to the fast changes (cf. Flood 2020). But that is an easy track of interpretation 
which imagines necessity as coming entirely from the outside. What is much 
more interesting is to see that the model “fast changes – delayed response” is 
based on two tacit presuppositions: first, the external necessity does not gain this 
status until the legal system recognises it to have it, and second, the law has 
to react to the necessity and gain the upper hand in the struggle with it. In the 
next section I’ll proceed to looking more closely into particular forms of the state 
of exception (or emergency) introduced in different countries: but regardless of 
a legal form in which exceptional measures were taken, the state of exception was 
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preserved as the overarching framework of the law in its relation to reality (see 
also Agamben 2005, 40; 2012, 140–143; 2019, 50–51). The idea that the internal 
directives of the law (for example, constitutionally guaranteed rights or freedoms) 
may be ignored, if “necessity so demands”, makes the category of necessity the 
Grundnorm of the legal system (thereby providing an obscene solution to 
the pre-war discussions between Kelsen and Schmitt). This feature may be 
called a generalised state of exception, transcending its particular incarna-
tions in domestic legal system. In other words, the state of exception exists not 
only when a particular legal device of this name is triggered (be it a state of 
emergency or the “state of epidemic”), but when the legal system jumps ahead 
of its foundational regulations in order to establish exceptions (at any level) that 
correspond not to the official constitutional principles of a given order, but to 
the necessity itself, as recognised by the law.
The imbalance in the relations between the state powers in favour of the 
executive is a logical consequence of this generalised state of exception. It posits 
a chain of continuity between (legally established) necessity, exceptional measures, 
the executive and the inclusion/exclusion of human beings through the category of 
citizenship. What they all express is the ultimate grip of the law, which transcends 
all particular devices in which the relationship between the legal system and the 
reality is constructed.
3. ‘LIBERALISM’ V. ‘ILLIBERALISM’: THE PANDEMICS TAKES IT ALL
But does that mean that the establishment of exceptional measures within the 
boundaries of constitutionalism or outside of it is irrelevant? From the perspective 
of radical Agambenism, that seems to be the conclusion: no matter how the law 
attempts to regulate its relation to the necessity, it will be always excessive and 
unpredictable, so particular legal devices which are triggered do not matter. Yet 
this perspective is throwing the baby out with the bathwater: while the primacy 
of the generalised state of exception can be recognised universally, reactions of 
particular regimes differ. As if confirming the Luhmannian perspective on the 
autopoietic responses to the outside, every legal system – be it liberal or ‘illiberal’ 
(in the type proposed and propagated by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán) 
– produces its own methods of addressing the necessity. Liberal reactions might
preserve a bigger scope of individual freedoms, which is non-negligeable even in 
the context of generalised state of exception. 
In the entire world, 96 countries declared some form of a state of emergency 
(COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker 2020; Bar-Siman-Tov 2020, 25). This makes 
the entire globe divided in half: the number of states that resorted to this device is 
almost equal to the number of those that did not. Naturally, one should not draw 
easy comparisons here: states of exceptions are not functional in all legal systems. 
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The decision whether to adopt a state of emergency or not is not easily attributable 
to the position of a country vis-à-vis the axis ‘liberalism – illiberalism’ (dubious 
as it might seem in itself). In Europe itself there have been liberal countries 
that did not resort to the state of emergency (Italy), and illiberal ones that did 
(Hungary). Hungary is a special case due to its Enabling Act, widely seen as 
introducing a ‘koronadiktatúra’ (Petrov 2020, 72). Poland, which did not adopted 
any constitutionally envisaged exceptional measures, is a specific example of 
populist governmentality based on a vast scope of inapplicability of the law. It 
seems, however, that the decision whether to use the state of exception in any 
form is secondary: both the declaration of its state and its non-declaration may be 
used and abused by states. One could claim that declaring the state of exception is 
a better safeguard of legal standards and individual freedoms, but the existence of 
the generalised state of exception overwrites, at any rate, the formal legal devices 
that aim to contain it. As usual, the necessity forces special legislation which in 
itself has exceptional character, thereby exceeding the framework of the state of 
exception that has been declared. As argued by Angelo Golia et al.,
the measures adopted were, to a greater or lesser extent, “exceptional” from at least two points 
of view: first, several governments resorted to new or rarely used legal instruments, often 
outside of established emergency powers or emergency regimes; secondly, these measures as 
a whole have (or have had) the potential to trigger or accelerate broader institutional shifts or 
reconfigurations. Although the duration and intensity of these shifts remain difficult to predict, 
there remains the potential for the pandemic and the measures taken to respond to it to induce 
substantial changes to constitutional structures. (Golia et al. 2020, 1)
The process of the generalised state of exception taking over the particular 
states of emergency is visible in numerous states. The US declared a State of 
National Emergency in March 2020, but it needed to be supplemented both by 
legislation – economic “deal packages” – whose impenetrability and convolution 
pave the way for concealed exceptions (Maxeiner 2020, 217–222). But the state 
of emergency was additionally supplemented with two classes of acts: binding 
executive orders of the President and non-binding guidelines, both ridden with 
inconsistencies and contradictions (Maxeiner 2020, 222–224). The chaos was only 
aggravated with competition between states and their contradictory regulations 
(Maxeiner 2020, 227–231).
Germany declared its state of health emergency, but not a constitutional state 
of exception; the proposal to replace the parliament with a standing committee was 
not carried out (Golia et al. 2020, 15–16). Nonetheless, more exceptional measures 
were needed than those offered by the Infektionsschutzgesetz. Heads of Länder 
governments and the Chancellor needed to convene in an extraconstitutional 
format in order to exchange information on the measures they adopted (Barczak 
2020). The effective state of emergency was a statutory, not constitutional measure 
(Golia et al. 2020, 33). Still, as it is claimed, the constitutional culture of Germany 
was strong enough to open a debate on the legality of the adopted measures:
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Besides these specific issues the first weeks of the pandemic also revealed 
much about German constitutional culture as a whole. This phase showed that 
German society has great respect for constitutional law, using it as a medium of 
reflection and a means of solving societal problems. The public debate regarding 
the COVID-19 measures was conducted in a highly legalistic manner and 
employed the categories of constitutional law. Significantly, for the most part 
these debates were carried out in the major daily newspapers as well as in online 
platforms such as the “Verfassungsblog”. Nevertheless, this mode of reflection was 
not formalistic but extremely considered and responsive, impacting the choice of 
concrete measures. It allowed politicians to develop solutions that they would not 
have been able to reach without this reflection process. Consequently, the crisis 
has also revealed the degree to which constitutional law guides political processes 
in Germany. This close interaction with German constitutional law has probably 
contributed significantly to the successful management of the first weeks of the 
pandemic in Germany (Golia et al. 2020, 6).
France, by contrast, introduced state of emergency (état d’urgence sanitaire) 
quite quickly, with a clear swerve towards exceptional measures issued by the 
executive headed by the Prime Minister (Golia et al. 2020, 6, 24). This state 
was not constitutional, but based on statutory regulations and the doctrine of 
exceptional circumstances (Golia et al. 2020, 17). This choice proved controversial, 
as it required further statutory amendments to legalise the postponement of 
the second round of municipal elections, which would not need to happen if 
constitutional state of exception was declared (Golia et al. 2020, 17–18). Italy, 
which does not have a proper constitutional regime of the state of exception, 
needed to rely on particular constitutional devices, such as the possibility of 
issuing decreti-legge (Golia et al. 2020, 18) ‘in casi straordinari di necessità e 
di urgenza’ (Art. 77 of the Italian Constitution), as well as on extraconstitutional 
administrative emergency instruments.
The distinction is, therefore, not necessarily between the countries that 
triggered constitutional states of exception and those that did not, but between 
the states that provided first a relatively coherent legal basis for future actions 
and those that acted patchily, without a coordinated legislative action, like Italy 
(Golia et al. 2020, 20–21). The same division cuts across ‘illiberal’ EU states. 
Hungary launched one of its constitutionally envisaged states of exception, 
namely the state of the danger of crisis, whereas the Polish ruling majority did 
not declare the state which the Constitution prescribed exactly for situations like 
pandemics, namely the state of national disaster (Drinóczi, Bień-Kacała 2020, 
178). But the patterns of action after these initial choices did not run along the 
lines of constitutionality/unconstitutionality. In Hungary, the Authorisation Act 
was adopted in clear breach of the Fundamental Law insofar as it legalised the 
decrees that had been already issued and paved the way for adopting new ones 
outside of the scope of parliamentary control (Drinóczi, Bień-Kacała 2020, 
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180). Poland declared a statutory state of emergency (“the state of epidemic”), 
only to adopt further anti-COVID measures by sub-statutory ordinances. Most 
conspicuously, prohibitions of movement, to all intents and purposes similar 
to curfews, were adopted on the basis of ordinances, in clear breach not only of 
the Constitution (Art. 52) and international law (Art. 5 ECHR among others), 
but even the statutory law in which they were allegedly grounded. Additional 
violations of the Polish constitution concern the illegal prohibition of the 
freedom of assembly, preparations for holding the presidential election via mail 
and, finally, postponing the election de facto without a constitutional mandate 
(Serowaniec, Witkowski 2020, 167–168; Drinóczi, Bień-Kacała 2020, 189–191). 
These measures demonstrate 
how illiberal constitutionalism works: leaders are still pursuing their illiberal ideas and needs 
– which can more smoothly be achieved in the pretense of fighting against a human pandemic. 
Second, how emergency legislative drafting techniques can be ‘illiberalized’ – which, 
admittedly, follows from the logic of the regime. (Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała 2020, 191)
Consequently, if the COVID-related states of exception demonstrate any 
global trend, they seem to contribute to the age-old debate on the possibility of 
curbing the state of exception within boundaries of the law. First, constitutional 
devices of the state of exception proved inadequate in many countries, the 
necessity being of a radically new character. As a result, statutory regulations of 
medical emergency were often triggered. Secondly, even these measures proved 
inadequate and required partial adjustments, often adopted via ordinances or 
decrees issued by the executive. It is true that a good constitutional framework 
fares better in exceptional times (Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała 2020, 172), but it 
does not dismantle the generalised state of exception, which overwrites it with 
particular measures taken praeter or even contra legem. 
4. COVID-19 CLUB OF SOVEREIGNS
The chain between the concepts of sovereignty, necessity and the executive 
– sealed by the generalised state of exception – is visible also on the international 
level. The national contraction made it problematic, with international institutions 
seeking legitimacy and influence by trying to help nation states in the pandemic. 
But international law has once again been revealed as an exclusive club of 
sovereigns. There are at least two dimensions of this process: international 
responsibility of states for spreading COVID and international human rights 
protection mechanisms that should intervene when human rights are endangered.
As far as the first issue is concerned, the rules on international responsibility of 
states (codified in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts), could allow to link the damages incurred by nations (financial 
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losses, costs of shutdowns and lockdowns, healthcare expenses) with an 
internationally wrongful actions undertaken by China. It might seem reasonable 
that the state in which the pandemic originated – and which adopted a secretive 
policy that prevented other states taking the necessary precautions – be found 
internationally responsible. According to Art. 3 DARS, “The characterization of 
an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. 
Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as 
lawful by internal law”. It has been proposed that the legal act on which China’s 
responsibility could be invoked are the International Health Regulations (IHR), 
a binding treaty approved by the WHO in 2005 and ratified by China (Mazzuoli 
2020, 441). Article 7 IHR envisages that “If a State Party has evidence of an 
unexpected or unusual public health event within its territory, irrespective of 
origin or source, which may constitute a public health emergency of international 
concern, it shall provide to WHO all relevant public health information.” 
This provision was clearly infringed by China in its non-dissemination policy 
(Mazzuoli 2020, 446–448). The trouble in demanding China’s responsibility is 
expressed, however, in the following question: “how could it be possible to claim 
damage reparation from China if many states have not done their duty to take 
proper measures of restriction and social isolation?” (Mazzuoli 2020, 456). 
Collusion between sovereign states, which are not interested in displaying their 
own failures, is an effective obstacle to demanding actions from China on the 
basis of international law. Contrary to the claim frequently pronounced in the 90s, 
according to which we live in a post-Westphalian era, focused on the common 
interest of humankind rather than state interest, the pandemic clearly reveals the 
role of sovereigns in international law.
International law did not prove efficient at the level of international human 
rights protection mechanisms. If we take into account the European Convention 
on Human Rights – allegedly, the most developed instrument of human rights 
protection in the world – we will see that its reaction to the COVID is hampered 
by two crucial obstacles. First, Art. 15 allows of derogations of some ECHR 
articles in times of war or a threat to the life of the nation. This article functions 
as nothing less but a state of exception in its own right (Bachmann, Sanden 2020, 
423). Ten countries invoked it in the period of the pandemic, usually derogating 
from the freedom of movement and assembly. More interestingly, these were 
the countries of Caucasus, South-Eastern Europe and two Baltic states; Western 
European countries did not resort to this measure, risking the future declarations 
of violations from the ECtHR if the measures they adopted were incompliant 
with limitation clauses of the Convention (Bachmann, Sanden 2020, 425–427). 
But even in case of the countries that did not use Art. 15, the scope of limitation 
clauses seems broad enough to encompass emergency measures (Dzehtsiarou 
2020), turning them into ‘micro-states of exception’. Second, by the delay in 
hearing cases by the Court – sometimes amounting up to 5 years – the states 
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are given an effective carte blanche for here and now. This adds to the rule of 
the executive, which finds itself ahead not only of the legislative, but even more 
importantly, of international judiciary. 
As a consequence, sovereign states remain key players in the field also on the 
international level. If, according to Schmitt, the state of exception allows us 
to recognise the true sovereign, it is a defence against external threat – framed 
in the concept of security – that gives this sovereign its popularly recognised 
legitimacy. International institutions were relegated to the subsidiary position 
by the pandemic; COVID-19 revealed that the states believe themselves to be 
the crucial actors whenever necessity is invoked and act accordingly. It could 
be therefore claimed that the generalised state of exception, having a foothold 
always on the domestic level, is potent enough not only to suspend or disregard 
constitutional norms, but also mechanisms of international law. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
Whenever COVID-19 is presented as a catastrophe, it needs to be seen in 
a correct perspective. The pandemic – apart from being a medical calamity 
in itself – only revealed the contours of the politico-legal framework that 
organises a response to the threat. This framework is contradictory: nourished 
by withered imagery of triumphant liberalism of the 90s, it is in fact based on the 
hollowing out of democratic institutions caused by decades of turbocapitalism. 
Authoritarianism is the song of today, both of autocratic technocrats in 
power and of populist movements that attempt to combat globalisation with 
strengthening of statal apparatuses. We wake up today with the same realisation 
that Schmitt made in the interwar period: parliamentary democracy is severely 
weakened, and the pandemic coup de grâce only reveals that its functioning 
has never been properly based on a coherent legal order guaranteeing universal 
rights and freedoms.
The problem of historical repetitiveness adds to our position vis-à-vis the 
catastrophe: we perceive it with an inkling of how the situation might deteriorate. 
As in Benjamin’s quip mentioned in the introduction, our tradition allows us 
to hear, but not see. We are perfectly able to understand how states of exception 
are constructed, executed and abused, yet the immediate perception of the 
catastrophe is shrouded by the thick fog of ideologemes describing COVID-19 as 
a chance to reconstruct capitalism, restore the nature and rebuild inter-individual 
relations. Against this Age-of-Aquarius-type of obscurantism (Das Neves 
Gonçalves 2020, 8, 12) we need to reaffirm the existence of the generalised state 
of exception that sustains the chain of other concepts: sovereignty, necessity and 
citizenship. What the pandemic demonstrated was a clear return to the sovereign 
logic, both on domestic and international levels. COVID-19 opened new-old paths 
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of governing the living (Agamben 2020a) that will play a planetary role in the 
future fights for dominance and imposing a new face of capitalism. That is what 
our tradition allows us to hear; but seeing is another matter and it still seems that 
we are living in the margin that the catastrophe will soon cease to grant us.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agamben, Giorgio. 2005. State of Exception (Homo sacer II, 1). Translated by Kevin Attell. 
Chicago–London: The University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1134d6w.16
Agamben, Giorgio. 2012. Opus Dei. Archeologia dell’ufficio (Homo sacer II, 5). Torino: Bollati 
Bolinghieri.
Agamben, Giorgio. 2019. Creation and Anarchy. The Work of Art and the Religion of Capitalism. 
Translated by Adam Kotsko. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press. https://doi.
org/10.1515/9781503609273
Agamben, Giorgio. 2020a. “Capitalismo comunista.” Quodlibet, December 15, 2020. https://www.
quodlibet.it/giorgio-agamben-capitalismo-comunista
Agamben, Giorgio. 2020b. “Contagio.” Quodlibet, March 11, 2020. https://www.quodlibet.it/
giorgio-agamben-contagio [Accessed: 17 June 2021].
Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London–New York: Verso.
Bachmann, Sascha-Dominik (Dov). Joachim Sanden. 2020. “State Responsibility for the (Public) 
Right to Health and Security in Times of COVID Pandemic A European Perspective.” 
Indonesian Journal of International & Comparative Law VII: 407–430.
Bar-Siman-Tov, Ittai. 2020. “COVID-19 meets politics: the novel coronavirus as a novel challenge 
for legislatures.” The Theory and Practice of Legislation 8(1–2): 11–48. https://doi.org/10.10
80/20508840.2020.1800250
Barczak, Tristan. 2020. “La pandémie :« heure de l’exécutif » ? Regard sur le droit d’exception 
de la République Fédérale d’Allemagne.” Jus Politicum, November 19, 2020. http://blog.
juspoliticum.com/2020/11/19/la-pandemie-heure-de-lexecutif-regard-sur-le-droit-dexception-
de-la-republique-federale-dallemagne-par-tristan-barczak/ [Accessed: 17 June 2021].
Benjamin, Walter. 1969a. “Some Reflections on Kafka.” In Illuminations. 141–146. Translated by 
Harry Zorn. New York: Schocken Books. 
Benjamin, Walter. 1969b. “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” In Illuminations. 253–264. 
Translated by Harry Zorn. New York: Schocken Books. 
Billig, Michael. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage.
Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo. 2020. “COVID-19, the Economy and Human Rights.” International 
Journal on Human Rights 30: 85–98. 
Borovitskaja, Aleksandra. 2020. “COVID-19: Into The Inferno.” Amsterdam Law Forum 12(3): 
9–14. https://doi.org/10.37974/ALF.364
Cormacaina, Ronan. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov. 2020. “Legislatures in the Time of Covid-19.” The Theory 
and Practice of Legislation 8(1–2): 3–9. https://doi.org/10.1080/20508840.2020.1816017
COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker. 2020. https://www.icnl.org/covid19tracker [Accessed: 17 June 
2021].
Drinóczi, Tímea. Agnieszka Bień-Kacała. 2020. “COVID-19 in Hungary and Poland: extraordinary 
situation and illiberal constitutionalism.” The Theory and Practice of Legislation 8(1–2): 
171–192. https://doi.org/10.1080/20508840.2020.1782109
© by the author, licensee Łódź University – Łódź University Press, Łódź, Poland. This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
A C TA U N I V E R S I TAT I S  L O D Z I E N S I S






The main objective of the following study is to introduce readers to the issue of 
the 2nd National Scientific Conference in the series “Atypical Employment Relations” organized 
on 3 October 2019 by the Centre for Atypical Employment Relations of the University of Lodz. 
The consequence of extending the right of coalition to persons performing paid work outside the 
employment relationship was that they were guaranteed important collective rights, which until 
1 January 2019 were reserved primarily for employees. The rights which Polish legislator ensured 
to non-employees include the right to equal treatment in employment due to membership in a trade 
union or performing trade union functions; the right to bargain with a view to the conclusion of 
collective agreement and other collective agreements; the right to bargain to resolve collective 
disputes and the right to organize strikes and other forms of protest, as well as the right to protect 
union activists. The author positively assesses the extension of collective rights to people engaged in 
gainful employment outside the employment relationship, noting a number of flawsand shortcomings 
of the analyzed norms. The manner of regulating this matter, through the mechanism of referring 
to the relevant provisions regulating the situation of employees, the statutory equalization of the 
scope of collective rights of non-employees with the situation of employees, the lack of criteria 
differentiating these rights, as well as the adopted model of trade union representation based on 
company trade unions, not taking into account the specific situation of people working for profit
outside the employment relationship, are the reasons why the amendment to the trade union law is 
seen critically and requires further changes.
right of coalition, persons engaged in gainful employment outside employment 
relationship, non-employees, collective employment law, trade union.
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